From: Ondré Debinski
        To: ENA Novas
        Subject: What we can learn from the Jo-burg affair
        OK, we need to do a more careful post mortem of this episode (sorry 
          about the choice of words, but you all know what I mean).
        Some lessons for us and ENA in general.
        Point one: SA made a grave mistake by asking for novas, any novas, 
          to come and help them deal with the situation. They did not fully understand 
          the differences in nova abilities and personality. To some extent this 
          was likely due to the rushed nature of the whole situation and that 
          SA did not have any nova knowledge of their own. The SSS was woefully 
          unprepared and believed they knew enough to advice the government on 
          what to do. Expect some heads to roll over there. But this lesson holds 
          for us too. We will likely get unreasonable requests from European governments 
          who do not understand much about novas. ENA can do a lot of good by 
          informing them and keeping them updated – much work here for Nice and 
          Stuttgart. Novas are not panaceas, novas cannot be used as standard 
          military or intelligence or any other forces. 
        Point two: getting novas to needed locations is messy. SA did have 
          a jet ready more or less by chance. Since we usually have to go by military 
          plane, train or other more inconvenient methods transport is often a 
          bottleneck. Right now the plane on loan from the UK Nova Task Force 
          is one of the major expenses of ENA, and that is just a single plane. 
          Flying tends to be frowned on in dense airspaces, and flying low is 
          a good way of attracting attention (trust me, I know).
        Point three: Cooperation didn’t seem to be a problem internally or 
          externally this time. From the reports I got you all got along well 
          with the SA authorities, formed good scanner teams (one scanner, one 
          defender) and when the shit hit the fan converged on the problem efficiently 
          and creatively (although some of the methods might be refined to cause 
          less property damage – not that anybody cared in this case). 
        Point four: We need better communication even during bad conditions. 
          Booster did a marvellous job with the radio system, but when nobody 
          is equipped with a functional radio it doesn’t help. I have asked R&D 
          to look into radio and phone systems for teams. They might not work 
          well during nuclear fighting, but at least for a bit more everyday situations 
          they could help coordination a lot.
        Point five: Heroism is great, but most of you rushed into a nuclear 
          blast area with no protection except bravery. Had not Mrs Mofetta been 
          present and helpful, I suspect most of you would be dead now due to 
          radiation poisoning. I guess the hair problems and stomach troubles 
          you have had so far are a sufficient reminder of that. 
        Point six: The big disaster occurred when one team did not act as a 
          team with the rest, and instead began to act on its own according to 
          eccentric premises. The root cause was of course the psychological instability 
          of Despairing Venus and Die Vampire, but there was no safeguard against 
          it. In a safely designed system there has to be failures on several 
          levels before things break down. We need to ensure that the psychological 
          disruption (or other problem) of one part of the team does not propagate 
          to the mission. More thought on planning is needed here. 
        Point seven: Once things got out of hand there was much improvisation. 
          It is important to be able to invent in the field, but again do not 
          take unnecessary risks. Major Ivalds’ jump into the fray was too risky, 
          and nearly cost him his life. 
        Point eight: Make sure you have pickup points and phone numbers ready 
          and memorized. The fact that Mr Doyle got left at the airport for *days* 
          is downright embarrassing.  
        To sum up, this mission was a mess, but it did succeed. Given the information 
          discovered later about the “stealthiness” of the boy when not using 
          his powers, it is unlikely the teams would have found him easily. Ordinary 
          police work might have worked, but the detonation made it both irrelevant 
          and impossible to use (STF was not prepared to get into ground zero; 
          you were). Once the boy was in the right hands he was brought to a safe 
          holding place with a minimum of risk and hassle. I know many of you 
          are shocked by the events, but consider this: had you not been there, 
          millions would have been at risk and quite likely killed when the boy 
          really blew. As it was, it was a tragedy, but you averted an even greater 
          disaster.